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Editorial on the Research Topic
Context in Communication: A Cognitive View
Context is a controversial concept. Research in philosophy of language, linguistics and cognitive
science has shown that the communicative content of an utterance is not limited to the conventional
content of what is said. The notion of context has been introduced in semantics and has assumed
a central role in language studies with the pragmatic turn that has shifted the focus from meaning
to speaker’s meaning, a change of paradigm that can be traced back to Wittgenstein’s conception of
language use (Wittgenstein, 1953) and to the work of philosophers of language like Austin (1962),
Grice (1975, 1978), and Searle (1969). In this framework pragmatics deals with the intentional
aspects of language use. The notion of context is then no more restricted to the interpretation of
indexicals and demonstratives (Kaplan, 1989). More generally, it applies to what is presupposed as
common ground among the participants in a conversation (Stalnaker, 2002, 2014).
From a cognitive perspective communication is an inferential process based on mental states
and shared knowledge (Clark, 1996). What contributes to interpret a communicative act beyond
the spoken words may, broadly speaking, be included. Intuitively, context is the background for
comprehension, what makes communication possible. This is a critical point. In fact, context both
is an inescapable concept in the study of communication and eludes univocal definition. There is
no one context but many.
In launching this Research Topic we did not expect to find a final definition or to have the
last say. We were interested in singling out the present lines of research in this field. The papers
we have collected attack the problem from different perspectives and using different research
methodologies.
The paper by Faber and León-Araúz is aimed at, if not final, a comprehensive and detailed
definition of context. They propose a taxonomy based on scope: local, spanning typically five items
before or after the term occurrence; and global, such as a whole text or all that goes beyond the
text such as the communicative situation. They apply this distinction to syntax, semantics, and
pragmatics even if, as they note, at this level the boundaries are fuzzy. The challenging enterprise of
detailing what context is, becomes mandatory in formalizing specialized knowledge resources, but
the results shed light on the structure of context in general language.
On the way of clarifying what context constitutively is, García-Carpintero addresses Stalnaker’s
notion of context as common ground, mentioned above, showing certain weaknesses. The
Stalnakerian view of common ground as sets of propositions reveals unsatisfying in cases of
expressions with rich illocutionary features. The most convincing cases are those of slurs and
pejoratives, where attempts to flatten the content into declarative form, will deprive context
of important dimensions of expressive meaning. Therefore, context, in addition to sets of
propositions, should be extended to include shared propositional commitments. Although the case
of pejoratives and slurs is the most convincing, the requirement for shared commitments appears
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in other cases examined by Garcia-Carpintero as well: directives,
questions, predicates of taste, pretense.
Notably, the set of shared commitments proposed by Garcia-
Carpintero includes aspects of the emotional state of the speaker.
A step further inside the personal and interpersonal spheres
is taken by Marques, investigating predicates of personal taste,
aesthetic or moral values. A well known drawback aﬄicting
contextual explanations is disagreement. If two conflicting
judgments can be explained by simply augmenting the original
sentences with propositions about the context of the two
speakers, disagreement should disappear. Marques argues for
contextualism, suggesting that disagreement can be addressed by
taking into account differences in non-doxastic attitudes, and is
enhanced by the evolutionary reinforcement of certain personal
dispositions in social coordination.
The main contender to the contextualist strategy defended
by Marques is relativism, which is contrasted with expressivism
in the paper by Frápolli and Villanueva. The idea is that there
are two main ways to accommodate context dependence, by
what they call building-block or organic models. The former, that
gives prominence to the principle of compositionality over the
principle of context, is proper to relativism, while the latter, that
privileges context over compositionality, belongs to expressivism.
While in the group of papers described so far, the main
perspective under which context is studied is semantic, enriched
with insights on mental phenomena, in the next group the
cognitive perspective prevails, asking questions about how
context is structured and accessed in the mind. Mazzone builds
upon one of the most developed theories in cognitive pragmatics,
Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1986) and discusses
how this theory succeeds in explaining the way relevant context
is constructed during utterance understanding. He identifies
a weakness in spelling out the mechanisms in place during
the process of selecting the context, which, suggests Mazzone,
can instead be identified in the combination of a bottom-up
activation of schemata, especially goal-directed schemata, with
a top-down activation of contextual information. This sort of
mechanism is supported by what is currently known about the
hierarchical structure of the frontal cortex.
Relevance Theory is the starting assumption also for Attardo,
in the search for a satisfactory context to explain utterances. He
stresses how the exploration of relevance is largely abductive
in nature, and remarks that the derivation of context requires
additional mechanisms that counteract the expansive tendencies
of relevance and abduction. Such bonding mechanisms, argues
Attardo, can be construed under the principles of satisfaction and
charity.
Paradigmatic in a cognitive perspective on context is the
discussion about the so-called Theory of Mind (ToM), the set of
skills that allow to attribute beliefs, goals, and percepts to other
people: how essential is this ability in constructing the context
necessary to understand utterances? The two contributions by
Kissine and Cummings provide two contrasting answers. For
Kissine there are grades of interpretative strategies to derive
relevant implicatures of an utterance, and the lower levels,
like the egocentric relevance, do not require any ToM. For
Cummings utterance interpretation is highly dependent on
attributing cognitive and affective mental states to the minds
of language users, and she proposes that for the purpose of
context derivation the best notion of ToM should encompass the
rational, intentional, holistic character of interpretation. Both
papers draw on studies with ASD (Autism Spectrum Disorder)
subjects to support their arguments. Kissine reports of subjects
with ASD able to correctly discriminate between “ironical” and
“literal” interpretations. Cummings reports clinical cases where
ASD subjects exhibit deficits covering the three cornerstones
of ToM she identified: rationality, intentionality, and
holism.
Airenti investigates young children’s ability to produce and
understand different forms of humor. In particular she focuses on
teasing, a form of humor already present in preverbal infants that
is also considered a typical feature of irony. She proposes that the
acquisition of specific communicative contexts enable children to
engage in humorous interactions before they possess the capacity
to analyze them in the terms afforded by a full-fledged ToM.
In addition to increase our understanding, the cognitive
perspective on context has important practical implications, as
in the divergent interpretations of numeric quantities reported
by Mandel. Subjects tend to assume large numerical quantities
not as exact values, rather adopting a lower-bound at least or an
upper-bound at most interpretation, depending on the context.
Several papers fall within the domain of experimental
pragmatics.
Filippi et al. explore the role of prosodic cues in word
learning. In natural situations learners have to identify words
within a sequence of sounds and to relate them to specific
referents extracted by the visual scene. Developmental research
has suggested that adults’ use of exaggerated pitch might direct
infants’ attention to specific elements in the context and guide
learning. In their study the authors show that also adults exposed
to an artificial language in different experimental conditions
exploit pitch enhancement as a pragmatic cue.
The role of intonation employed as an indicator of focus in
pragmatic interpretation is treated in Cummins and Rohde. In
Gricean pragmatics the interpretation of an utterance is based
on the relation between what has been said and the potential
utterances that would have been relevant to the current discourse
purpose, had it been uttered. This set of relevant alternatives is
defined in the notion of Question Under Discussion (Roberts,
1996/2012). The three experiments reported in this study showed
that hearers used the intonation as an indication of which QUD
is currently in play in the interpretation of scalar implicatures,
presuppositions, and coreference.
Domaneschi et al. maintain that for the analysis of context an
important role is played by cognitive load. In fact, cognitive effort
might have an effect on which presuppositions are activated. In
their study they show this effect with presupposition selection in
conditional sentences with a trigger in the consequent. The effect
of cognitive effort in interpreting communicative utterances
involving pragmatic enrichment is also the subject of Janssens
and Schaeken’s paper. However, their study showed no influence
of the working memory load on the performance in the task of
inferring the implicatures from but, so and nevertheless. They
also found that a major role in interpretation is played by the
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content of the arguments suggesting that context and content are
fundamental in the interpretation process.
In their paper Dupuy et al. discuss how the context affects the
interpretation of scalar implicatures. In particular, they focus on
the pragmatic interpretation of some. They test two factors, the
existence of factual information that facilitates the computation
of pragmatic interpretations in the context, i.e., the cardinality
of the domain of quantification, and the fact that the context
makes the difference between the semantic and the pragmatic
interpretations relevant. Their results suggest that themain factor
that enhances pragmatic interpretation is the relevance of the
contrast that in turn increases the salience of the cardinality.
Two papers use event-related potential (ERP)
electrophysiological technique to analyze the role of context in
the comprehension of two important pragmatic phenomena,
metaphor and referential ambiguity. Bambini et al. conducted
two experiments in which EEG activity was recorded when
participants were presented with metaphors in two different
context situations, a minimal vs. a supportive context. Their
results suggest the presence of two dissociable ERP signatures
in the processing of metaphors. In fact, the N400 effect was
visible only in minimal context, whereas the P600 was visible
both in the absence and in the presence of contextual cues.
From these data the authors argue that linguistic context reduces
the effort in retrieving lexical aspects of metaphors but does
not suppress later pragmatic interpretation efforts needed in
order to derive the speaker’s intended meaning. Jiang and Zhou
investigate how a comprehender resolves referential ambiguity in
a conversation by using information concerning the social status
of communicators in the context, and how empathic sensitivity
to the social status information modulates ambiguity perception
and the underlying neural activity. Electrophysiologically, they
show the existence of differential neurocognitive processes
underlying ambiguity resolution with different contextual cues.
Two papers analyze communication in context as a diagnostic
and clinical resource.
Arcara and Bambini propose a test (APACS) to evaluate
pragmatic abilities in clinical populations with acquired
communicative deficits, ranging from schizophrenia to
neurodegenerative diseases. The test consists of six tasks
devoted to assess different pragmatic abilities in the domains of
discourse and nonliteral communication. Their assumption is
that while globally depending on context, different pragmatic
aspects might involve different cognitive skills.
Stahl and Van Lancker Sidtis analyze the contribution of
formulaic expressions in clinical rehabilitation from speech and
language disorders after stroke. For these patients formulaic
expressions frequently remain one of the few resources available
for communication. Therapy may support them in including
these expressions within language games, i.e., communicative
exchanges based on turn-taking. In this way the conversational
context allows patients to exploit their residual resources in order
to reestablish social interactions.
Edwards deals with an extreme case of communication
reporting her fieldwork with a community of deaf-blind people
in Seattle. Edwards via the analysis of interactional sequences
and subjects’ metapragmatic commentary shows how deaf-
blind people use tactile-kinesthetic channels to overcome the
difficulty to converge on objects of reference. She discusses two
mechanisms that can account for this process: embedding in
the social field and deictic integration. She argues that together
they yield a deictic system set to retrieve a restricted range of
values from the extra-linguistic context, thereby attenuating the
cognitive demands of intention attribution.
In summary, this research topic is a sampling of innovative
efforts to address challenging issues on context, involving
complex questions spanning from brain processes to social
interactions and pragmatics. This sampling witnesses a growing,
vibrant community of researchers attempting to integrate the
knowledge, the methods, and the theory-building tools from
philosophy of language, linguistics, cognitive science, and
cognitive neuroscience.
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